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Equality Is a Brokered Idea
Robert L. Tsai*
ABSTRACT
This essay examines the Supreme Court's stunning decision in the census case,
Department of Commerce v. New York. Professor Robert Tsai characterizes Chief
Justice John Roberts's decision to side with the liberals as a collective effort to
pursue the ends of equality by other means by subjecting the government's action
to the rule ofreason. Although the issue for appeal was limited in scope, the stakes
for political and racial equality were sky high. In blocking the administration from
adding a citizenship question to the 2020 Census, five members of the Court found
the justification the administration gave to be a pretext. In this instance, official lies
had a major consequence: Republican officials were not permitted to carry out their
apparent scheme to engage in partisan entrenchment by depressing census
responses from Hispanic citizens and undocumented migrants. Professor Tsai
defends this creative effort to manipulate the political value of time and shows how
the Court's rationale operates as an effective substitute for the principle of equality
under difficult circumstances. Unequal policies flourish in an environment where
mendacity by public officials is tolerated. It follows that by ensuring there are
consequences for policies backed by lies, judges can make it harder to target
political minorities with impunity.
INTRODUCTION
We have long been warned not to expect too much from people when it
comes to defending the principle of equality. Take the U.S. Supreme Court.
For every Strauder v. West Virginia,' Brown v. Board of Education,2 or
Obergefell v. Hodges3 that extended equal respect to those previously denied
* Clifford Scott Green Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law, Temple University,
Beasley School of Law, Fall 2019; Professor of Law, American University, Washington
College of Law. Thanks to Nelson Tebbe, Hermine Duplany, and Sara Douki for comments
on earlier drafts. I am also grateful for the editorial support provided by Taylor Dowd, Boseul
(Jenny) Jeong and the staff of the George Washington Law Review.
1 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (invalidating state law that forbid black males from serving
on juries because law "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to . . . race prejudice").
2 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that state's segregation of schoolchildren
according to race was "inherently unequal").
3 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (concluding that laws forbidding same-sex marriage
denied "equal dignity").
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it, there is a disastrous ruling like Plessy v. Ferguson,' McCleskey v. Kemp,'
or Trump v. Hawaii' that provided cover for major inequities and
demoralized friends of equality-sometimes lasting for generations. And if
we think that even the rulings that are praiseworthy have faults of their own,
these outcomes can actually be mapped somewhere between horrible and
pretty good, with few if any truly outstanding defenses of equality.
There are several explanations why we have had such a hard time doing
the work of equality in vigorous fashion. Political scientists have shown us
that courts generally, but the Supreme Court in particular, behave in largely
majoritarian fashion despite certain design choices originally made by the
Constitution's framers to facilitate a degree of independence.' When federal
judges strike down laws, they have tended to be most confident vindicating
national norms (including constitutional rights) when state laws are
involved.8 By contrast, the desire to remain part of the national elite and to
avoid an open clash with a coordinate branch is a recurring theme of the
federal judiciary's history, so when the Court has invalidated a federal law,
it's usually been when no real fear of backlash exists or when Justices have
found it safe enough to prune a national policy.9
Critical theorists have a different explanation, but it's also built upon
this same basic majoritarian insight: they say that progress on equality,
particularly when it comes to safeguarding the rights of African Americans,
has been made only when white citizens have perceived some advantage to
come from enlarging the notion of equality, producing what Derrick Bell
famously called a "convergence of . .. interests." 0 But whatever explanation
4 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding racially segregated railroads).
5 481 U.S. 279, 287, 291, 297 (1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge to Georgia's
death penalty despite study that showed black defendants are significantly more likely to be
sentenced to death than white defendants).
6 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (upholding ban on travel from several majority Muslim
countries).
7 See generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999); Robert A. Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279 (1957); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,
50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001).
8 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial
Activism, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1752, 1774-82 (2007). More refined data suggests that liberal
Justices have generally been more willing to strike down state laws than federal laws over the
years, and that conservative Justices have shown a slightly greater willingness to strike down
federal laws over state laws. See id. at 1768-70.
9 See Dahl, supra note 7, at 287-88.
10 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518, 526 (1980). Bell's original account made it largely a black-
white dynamic, and some scholars have subsequently sought to build more complexity into
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one prefers, it seems clear that civic leaders must feel it sufficiently culturally
safe, legally productive, and institutionally worthwhile before they will act
to enforce the idea of equality.
I. PRACTICAL EGALITARIANISM
I have recently presented a refinement of these accounts. In my new
book, Practical Equality," I argue that what's crucial is not so much
conceptual differences that prevent institutions from doing the hard work of
equality (although such disagreements certainly exist), but rather practical
concerns decisionmakers have about the actual effects of equality-real or
imagined.1 2 Human beings are far more consequentialist in their decision
making than they are willing to admit. Accordingly, they have proven
themselves willing to adjust their principles when they do not like where
steadfast commitment to those principles might lead. Hesitation over the
consequences of equality has sometimes led to lousy excuses, gigantic
exceptions, and cynical ploys to duck hard questions. While we shouldn't
give in completely to outcome-based thinking, neither should we deny that
concerns about the effects of equality-what Justice William Brennan once
called "a fear of too much justice"l 3-can dampen the idea's potency.
Putting off a decision or accepting a watered-down theory of equality
might be justifiable when the risk of disaster outweighs the potential for
incremental progress, of course, so I'm not inalterably opposed to such
strategies, but they do come with their own costs. My main point is that there
are more options than deferral or appeasement for managing the stress that
comes from equality claims.
his theory. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253, 274 (2005).
11 ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION
(2019).
12 See William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and
the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21, 26 (2011); Richard Delgado, TWhy
Obama? An Interest Convergence Explanation ofthe Nation's First Black President, 33 LAW
& INEQ. 345, 361-62 (2015); Lana Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy:
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HiST. 92, 98
(2004); Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider and
Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT Identity, 42 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2015).
13 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). There, the
Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote rejected a death-row inmate's racial discrimination claim largely
because of the perceived effects on the criminal justice system as a whole. This prompted
Brennan's famous rejoinder. In my book, I revisit the debate behind the scenes, emphasizing
how this fear of system-wide effects from the principle of equality took on a larger-than-life
role in Justice Powell's thinking. He took an active role lobbying his colleagues against the
defendant's position.
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Nor should we forget the importance of institutional context. At least in
this life, there's no such thing as pure equality. Already a deeply fraught idea,
the meaning of equality exists only as a product of multiple compromises
between people with different philosophical outlooks who inhabit
institutions that possess the actual power to reduce human suffering.
Inequities can only be ameliorated by finding effective ways to unlock that
power.
Thus, we ignore the recurring roadblocks to equality at our peril. By
failing to account for the many reasons why people in power hesitate to
vindicate the ideal of equality, we actually miss out on opportunities to
reduce inequities that might lie before us. Additionally, while there may be
short-term glory in fighting the good fight and going down swinging, it might
be better in the long term to avoid a terrible, demoralizing defeat, as long as
doing so can be said to improve the conditions of the marginalized in some
way.
So, what are the sorts of things we fear from the idea of equality? The
most frequently occurring impediments to vindicating an equality claim are
concerns about altering a valuable social good, the risk of political backlash,
and even a distaste for branding someone a bigot." No matter which
conception we might prefer, equality is an inherently disruptive idea."
Religious accounts capture this essential truth.' 6 Our own troubled past has
also underscored this lesson, even if not everyone is willing to learn from it.
For instance, it's worth recalling that in 1953 the Supreme Court nearly
reaffirmed Plessy. Even as the Justices bought time for themselves by
scheduling the case for reargument after a conference failed to produce five
votes favoring the principle of racial equality, they struggled with the very
tangible fear that ruling in favor of the black schoolchildren would lead to
"subversion or even defiance of our mandates in many communities" (as
Justice Tom Clark explained) or portend "the end of Southern liberalism" (as
Justice Hugo Black put it)." With the mythological status accorded Brown
14 See TSAI, supra note 11, at 13-25.
15 Anti-subordination accounts are perhaps more vigorous than formalistic ones, but
even formal equality has some bite: when a certain group has been excluded from a social
good. The re-ordering that's required after formal exclusion will almost always be disruptive
in some respects. For an overview of the anti-subordination approach, see Ruth Colker, The
Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 59-60 (1987).
16 Early Christianity's elevation of table fellowship as an ideal for equal status within
the community, one that included the women, the lame, and the poor, was so dangerous that
it led to denunciations. Jesus of Nazareth himself is remembered to have warned: "Do not
suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth: it is not peace I have come to bring, but
a sword." Matthew 10:34 (New Jerusalem).
17 See TSAI, supra note 11, at 24-25. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
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today, it's also easy to ignore the fact that barely a majority of Americans
supported the ruling when it first came down in 1954.18 In other words, a
fragile institutional consensus among elites was forged first, and decisive
cultural support emerged only later.19
Faced with the potentially undesirable effects of equality, one answer is
to sharply limit the reach of the principle of equality; another is to bob and
weave to avoid addressing tough questions. Those are the choices that run
through the heads of most decisionmakers.
But all is not lost. There is another option. Sometimes, it's better to
recharacterize an equality dispute in a slightly different way to reframe the
stakes, when doing so has a shot at securing the support of crucial allies and
lifting someone's unequal burdens right away. I call this practical
egalitarianism, which is a fancy term for doing the work of equality by other
means. We could instead see a controversy over equality as a due process
matter or one that's governed by the rule of reason, or in the right
circumstances, as best resolved according to some other principles. If such
an opportunity arises and the dispute is handled with an egalitarian mindset,
it can be possible to both reduce the harms suffered by a marginalized
community and create a precedent that can help build a culture of equality.
II. RULE OF REASON IN ACTION-THE CENSUS CASE
Of all the Supreme Court's decisions last term, the most intriguing
example of Justices doing the work of equality by other means can be found
in the recent census case. By a 5-4 vote, Justice John Roberts's opinion in
Department of Commerce v. New York20 (The Census Case) dismantled the
Trump administration's argument that its motive for including a question
about the citizenship of respondents was to enforce the Voting Rights Act.2 1
In a surprising turn of events, the majority affirmed the lower court's
preliminary injunction blocking the new query on the ground that "the sole
stated reason [] seems to have been contrived." 2 2 Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross had already long ago decided to add the question, and only then
did the agency run around seeking another agency to support its call for
citizenship information. 23 Although the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
18 See Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions ofLaw, 90 IOwAL. REV. 1095, 1135-36 (2005).
19 On the role of the Cold War in changing attitudes about civil rights, see generally
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2011).
20 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
21 See id. at 2574-76.
22 Id. at 2575.
23 See id. at 2574.
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eventually backed the Department of Commerce ("DOC"), DOJ never
behaved like this information was useful for its voting rights work.24
Roberts joined the four liberals on the Court by invoking the rule of
reason, emphasizing that "[t]he reasoned explanation requirement of
administrative law ... is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine
justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by
courts and the interested public."2 5 In doing so, he confounded the
administration and brought his usual conservative comrades on the Court to
denounce him for spearheading an "unprecedented departure from our
deferential review of discretionary agency decisions "26 and "usher[ing] in an
era of 'disruptive practical consequences"'27 President Trump himself is said
to have seethed privately about Roberts's role in thwarting his plot.28
Deploying the rule of reason is not the same thing as enforcing the
equality principle in a full-throated way because it lacks the precise
condemnatory rhetoric associated with equality, but that almost certainly
was not going to happen anyway in the case presented to the High Court. In
fact, the district judge had already rejected the equality claim and instead
opted for the alternative rationale that the agency hadn't presented a
reasonable justification for its decision as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act.29 Subsequently, in granting review, the Supreme Court had
not opted to review the Equal Protection claim.30 Even so, the real mystery
24 See id. at 2575.
25 Id at 2575-76.
26 Id at 2576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27 Id at 2605-06 (Alito, J., dissenting).
28 See Asawin Suebsaeng, Trump Declares from the Rose Garden He 's Not Owned on
the Census, DAILY BEAST (July 11, 2019, 6:49 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/2020-
census-citizenship-question-tmump-declares-from-the-rose-garden-hes-not-owned
[https://perma.cc/9G2C-RFEU].
29 See New York v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
30 See Questions Presented, Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 18-966),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/18-00966qp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MJA-ZW43]. When
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court asked only the following questions to be briefed and
argued:
1. Whether the district court erred in enjoining the Secretary of Commerce from
reinstating a question about citizenship to the 2020 decennial census on the ground
that the Secretary's decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 701 etseq.
2. Whether, in an action seeking to set aside agency action under the APA, a district
court may order discovery outside the administrative record to probe the mental
processes of the agency decisionmaker-including by compelling the testimony of
highranking Executive Branch officials-without a strong showing that the
decisionmaker disbelieved the objective reasons in the administrative record,
irreversibly prejudged the issue, or acted on a legally forbidden basis.
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remained: just how badly would the Roberts Court damage the cause of
political and racial equality?
Here's why this was a high-stakes dispute over equality even though the
Court was never going to directly address the equality claim. The
government's own Census Bureau had warned the Secretary of Commerce
that asking about citizenship would reduce the accuracy of the census.3 1
Their models showed that it would likely lead to the undercounting of
Hispanic citizens and noncitizens by increasing nonresponses by some
630,000 households.3 2
According to the U.S. Constitution's Enumeration Clause, information
about a state's "respective Numbers" from the census, to be taken every ten
years, would be used to allocate representatives to the House of
Representatives.3 3 The Fourteenth Amendment specifically directs that
representatives be allocated based on "the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed."34
For their part, the plaintiffs had originally accused the Trump
administration of violating the principle of equality in two respects:
(1) expressing animus against noncitizens and/or Hispanic people, who are
to be counted by the clear terms of the Constitution but might not be; and
(2) damaging the political equality of states whose representation would be
negatively impacted by undercounting noncitizens and racial minorities
dissuaded from responding to census takers due to the question's inclusion.35
At the time, plaintiffs built a circumstantial case of intent to harm on the
basis of citizenship status and race.36 The case was based on evidence that
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross had decided to add the question after
conversations with anti-immigration figures like Steve Bannon and Kris
Kobach, plus the unequal effects of the policy change.3 7
Id.
31 See Gregory Wallace, Here's How the Census Bureau Can Find Out Who's a Citizen,
CNN (July 11, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/1 1/politics/census-citizenship-question-
altematives/index.html [https://perma.cc/9AZK-ATB4].
32 See Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2588 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Joint
Appendix at 114, Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-996), Memorandum
from John M. Abowd, Chief Scientist & Assoc. Dir. For Research & Methodology to Wilbur
L. Ross, Jr., Secretary of Commerce (Jan. 19, 2018)).
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
35 See New York v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 515, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
36 See id. at 664.
37 See id. at 670-71.
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On the other hand, there's no specific language in the Constitution that
prohibits the government from inquiring about citizenship during a census,38
and many nations already do just that.39 If adding the question to the census
violates the concept of equality, it's only because the exercise of otherwise
permissible authority has become tainted by an improper motivation, not
because there is, or should be, an absolute bar against this course of action.
The circumstantial structure of the plaintiffs' equality claim helps us to
understand why the four liberals on the Court, who suspected something
nefarious was afoot, would be willing to swallow a less-than-ideal
justification: they simply could not get enough votes for their more
expansive position. But it doesn't explain how they pried the Chief away
from his usual allies.
Now, why on earth would Chief Justice Roberts provide the critical fifth
vote to stop the administration dead in its tracks, for all practical purposes?
We will not know for sure until either Roberts speaks publicly on the matter
or historians have had a chance to pore over the draft opinions and memos
that were exchanged between chambers. But it's possible to venture some
hypotheses based on what we know about the jurists' philosophical
inclinations and their behavior in past high-profile disputes, such as when
Roberts changed his mind at the last moment and found a way to uphold
Obamacare.40
The fractured outcome in the Census Case suggests that Roberts might
have initially voted with his usual conservative colleagues, then at some
point changed his mind. Experienced court watcher Linda Greenhouse points
to the published texts themselves: "the opinions that provide the holding-
the chief justice's plus the partially concurring opinion of Justice Stephen
Breyer for the court's four liberals-have all the hallmarks of judicial
tectonic plates that shifted late in the day to produce an outcome that none
of the players anticipated at the start."" I agree with Greenhouse's
38 To be sure, it's theoretically possible to come up with a coherent theory about what
the Census Clause is designed to accomplish, along with the later Reconstruction
Amendments, that would create an absolute bar to a citizenship question. But the only point I
want to make is that in the absence of clear language in the Constitution itself, finding a
prohibition on asking about citizenship is a tough ask of a centrist jurist and a nonstarter with
the most conservative members of the Court. See also Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139
S. Ct. 2551, 2566-67 (2019) (concluding that the Enumeration Clause implicitly permits
Congress to ask questions about citizenship).
39 See id. at 2563.
40 See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
41 Linda Greenhouse, It's Not Nice to Lie to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TiMES (July 3,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/opinion/trump-supreme-court-census.html
[https://perma.cc/2QEW-BREP].
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observation, though I'm going to push the point further and defend the
Chief's possible flip-flop on broader egalitarian grounds.
The beginning of Roberts's opinion, which finds no objection from the
Enumeration Clause itself from asking a citizenship question, feels like it
initially appeared in a draft opinion upholding the agency's action, while the
key section containing the analysis that's adverse to the government is buried
like a last-minute insertion.4 2 Breyer's lengthy concurring opinion-joined
by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan-
reads like it might have originally been written as a dissent. 43 Most observers
certainly felt after oral argument in August that there were five votes to
uphold the government's position.4 4
What happened? One theory is that, after voting with the conservatives
and assigning the opinion to himself, the opinion just wouldn't write. That
kind of thing has happened before.4 1 It's a largely internal explanation that
holds that certain doctrines can appear less convincing as the judge assigned
to draft an opinion begins to actually work with them. But another, external,
possibility is that Roberts was shaken by last-minute revelations that figures
close to the administration added the citizenship question precisely to
depress responses by noncitizens and artificially enhance the Republican
Party's political power. So-called "smoking gun" evidence that bolstered the
plaintiffs' theory of the case had appeared after the oral argument before the
High Court, in the weeks before the decision was expected.4 6
This extrajudicial evidence had been widely reported by the media but
had not yet been tested in court. But it looked damning.4' According to those
42 See generally Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2561-63.
43 See generally id. at 2584-95. (Breyer, J., concurring).
44 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, On Census Citizenship Question, Supreme Court's
Conservatives Appear United, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/us/politics/supreme-court-census-citizenship.html
[https://perma.cc/6XYF-7FDG]; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Divided Court Seems
Ready to Uphold Citizenship Question on 2020 Census, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:30
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/argument-analysis-divided-court-seems-ready-
to-uphold-citizenship-question-on-2020-census/ [https://perma.cc/3CWM-ZJMQ].
45 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2012, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/1 1/the-mystery-of-john-
roberts/ [https://perma.cc/76EL-89FP] (detailing how Justice Kennedy changed his mind in
Lee v. Weisman after being assigned to draft the opinion upholding school-sponsored prayer).
46 See Tara Bahrampour, Justice Department Says Allegations That It Hid True Motives





47 See Tara Bahrampour & Robert Barnes, Despite Trump Administration Denials, New
Evidence Suggests Census Citizenship Question Was Crafted to Benefit White Republicans,
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reports, newly discovered computer files and email correspondence showed
that a Republican consultant Tom Hofeller had advised key figures to add
the citizenship question to the 2020 census after his own research indicated
that doing so would give a political advantage to "Republicans and non-
Hispanic whites.""8 The Fourth Circuit took this evidence seriously, sending
the appeal of a similar challenge to the census question back to the district
court to assess the impact of this new evidence of bias.49 Two days later,
Chief Justice Roberts's own bombshell then dropped. The message was
unmistakable: don't treat us like patsies.50
Had the Justices rushed to ratify the administration's decision after this
blockbuster revelation, history could very well have judged them harshly.
And they would have deserved it. The Court had recently suffered a well-
deserved blow to its reputation for rendering impartial judgements after
whitewashing Trump's ban on travel from several Muslim countries. 5 ' The
possibility of damage to the Court's stature from its handling of the Census
Case could have been more lasting if it was perceived as part of a partisan
and racist plot to entrench Republican power that lasted a decade or more.
Already there was an impression in many quarters that the Roberts Court is
a highly partisan institution, exacerbated by Kavanaugh's seat "stolen" by
Republicans through political hardball. 52 The Supreme Court has always
been a political institution, and it has sometimes been a nakedly partisan one.
Even so, key to its legitimacy is avoiding unforced errors that wound its




48 Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist 's Hard Drives Reveal New Details on
the Census Citizenship Question, N.Y. TiMES (May 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-hofeller.html
[https://perma.cc/L6PR-6CL9].
49 See Michael Wines, Reopened Legal Challenge to Census Citizenship Question
Throws Case Into Chaos, N.Y. TiMEs (June 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/census-citizenship-question.html
[https://perma.cc/VZR5-CM7Q].
50 See Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575-76 ("Accepting
contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of [the reasoned explanation requirement of
administrative law.] If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand
something better than the explanation offered ... in this case.").
51 See, e.g., Aziz Huq, The Travel Ban Decision Echoes Some of the Worst Supreme
Court Decisions in History, Vox (June 26, 2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2018/6/26/17507014/travel-ban-intemment-camp-supreme-court-korematsu-muslim-
history [https://perma.cc/7GHA-5TTW].
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reputation in the second, and more corrosive, sense. Avoiding the impression
that the Court is nothing more than an adjunct of the Republican Party is
precisely the kind of concern that has led Roberts occasionally to think
twice.5
Although the census decision stopped short of actually finding animus
or some other improper motives, characteristics of an Equal Protection
violation, the rationale did provide the next best thing. There are three ways
government action can fail the rule of reason: (1) it's motivated by an
improper purpose-such as an unconstitutional motive; (2) there is
insufficient support for the government's stated reason; or (3) the reason
given is a "pretext" and so can't be believed-the mismatch between the
evidence and the given reason is so great that what the lawyers are saying
now in court are post-hoc rationalizations rather than the authentic
motivations of the agency's decisionmakers.
Roberts's opinion declined to make a ruling about the government
official's true motives and said that there is sufficient evidence to support the
Secretary's decision to ask the citizenship question as one among several
useful methods for gathering demographic information. 4 Yet, it held that the
claim about needing citizenship information to enforce the Voting Rights
Act nevertheless amounted to a pretext because there was "a significant
mismatch between the decision the Secretary made and the rationale he
provided."" Critically, this last finding alone was enough to block to the
agency action. 6
Obviously, the big unanswered question Roberts's opinion refuses to
answer is this: if the Voting Rights Act-based reason was a lie, then what
was the agency's true reason? One thing we need to remember is that
evidence of pretext can in some instances be treated as evidence of improper
motive (it's evidence of a guilty mind, after all), especially when combined
with other evidence of misconduct." It's possible that Roberts was
sufficiently concerned about discrimination but was unable or unwilling to
make that finding. If that's right, then, sending the case back to the courts
below then became the compromise that resolved those tensions, at least
temporarily. But there can be little doubt that finding pretext improves
plaintiffs' claim as to improper purpose in any subsequent proceedings.
53 See generally JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 329-32 (2019).
54 See Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2598.
55 Id. at 2575.
56 Id. at 2576.
57 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
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That brings us to the curious role of time. As political theorist Elizabeth
Cohen observes, time "is a valuable good that is frequently used to transact
over power."" Cohen also notes that "time can sometimes also be used as a
means of rectifying injustices" 5 9-including by promoting egalitarian ends.
Usually, though, when time is of the essence in the justice system, that factor
strengthens the government's hand because lawyers can claim some kind of
exigency for its actions. And most of the time, that added psychic stress
renders judges incredibly compliant with the government's demands. All
along, DOJ insisted that a final decision by the end of June was necessary so
the administration could meet its constitutional obligation to perform the
census on time.60
This time, an impending deadline didn't damage the pro-equality
position. To the contrary, time was very creatively manipulated to shorten
the clock and thereby promote egalitarian ends. That Roberts was willing to
prolong the proceedings by invoking the rule of reason was surprising, since
it raised the very real possibility that the administration would lose this fight
on a de facto basis: it might simply have to concede defeat and print the
census forms without the question because there wouldn't be enough time to
defend against the remaining claims in the case. That Roberts was willing to
swallow this possibility strongly suggests that he wanted to avoid an
outcome he felt was somehow worse (e.g., the perception of whitewashing
misconduct) or that he was persuaded there really was a colorable Equal
Protection argument but just couldn't bring himself to say so on the record
before him.
Either way, the rule of reason suddenly seemed like an attractive
justification to avoid a regrettable precedent or to give the plaintiffs a fair
chance to probe the new evidence. And, if a conservative like Roberts had
concerns about any downstream consequences of actually holding that the
Equal Protection Clause operated as a viable constraint on the Enumeration
Clause, that day was pushed into the distance for now, particularly if there
was a chance the dispute could evaporate on its own.
There was certainly some risk this time-based gambit would fail. In
theory, the ruling gave the administration another bite at the apple, so the
rule of reason was not formally an end-of-the-line loss for proponents of the
citizenship question. This allowed the government to claim that the power it
58 ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME 3-4 (2018).
59 Id. at 17.
60 Motion for Expedited Consideration of the Petition For a Writ of Certiorari Before
Judgment and for Expedited Merits Briefing and Oral Argument in the Event that the Court
Grants the Petition at 4-5, Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (No. 18-966).
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exercised was in fact a lawful one, as well as to spend some time looking for
ways to come up with a new reason for adding the question to the census.
Roberts's behavior reminds me of another occasion where the stakes for
equality were apparent to all, and where he showed a willingness to cross the
ideological divide and join the more liberal members of the Court when he
has been convinced that the scope of a precedent could be carefully limited.
In 2017, Justice Roberts wrote the opinion in Buck v. Davis overturning
Duane Edward Buck's death sentence because of an unacceptable risk that
racial discrimination had infected the proceedings.' The defendant's own
court-appointed lawyer had put on an expert who testified that being black
made someone more dangerous. 62 That this testimony was irrational-e.g.,
its introduction violated the rule of reason-ended up appealing to Roberts.
Undoubtedly comforted that the precedent wouldn't remake the entire
justice system, Justice Roberts gave one of his most eloquent vindications of
equality, saying that the expert's testimony "appealed to a powerful racial
stereotype-that of black men as 'violence prone."' 63 That mistake, he
insisted, improperly made "race directly pertinent on the question of life or
death."6' But it wasn't formally an equal protection case; it was a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel case.6' The apparent violation of rule of reason
norms had apparently unlocked Roberts's egalitarian sensibility.
III. THE RULE OF REASON AS A SUB STITUTE FOR EQUALITY
More broadly, the rule of reason can occasionally serve as a second-best
solution when equality as a principle seems out of reach. As I've explained,
there is a deep connection between enforcing the demands of reason and
safeguarding political minorities. Any doctrine that checks blind deference
to government officials, and along the way emphasizes empiricism, can only
enhance the project of building a more equal and just society-given that it's
already so hard to convince those in power to see bias and, even when they
see injustice, to do something about it. The Census Case puts government
officials on notice that their explanations will, in fact, be scrutinized and that
they have to make sense. This is something that egalitarians should cheer.
The rule of reason runs throughout our constitutional and common law
tradition, appearing in everything from the concept of self-defense to the
Fourth Amendment to the Equal Protection Clause. The Administrative
61 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776-77 (2017). On that occasion, Roberts and
Kennedy both joined the liberals, making it a 6-2 ruling. Thomas, joined by Alito, dissented.
62 See id. at 776.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 777.
65 See id. at 767.
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Procedure Act codifies a version of this approach, balancing agency
expertise, accuracy, and accountability.6 6 Roberts's opinion demonstrated
the critical features of the rule of reason as I've described them elsewhere.67
First, power must always be justified, and it's more than about who gets to
decide a question. 8 Second, a governmental justification must be grounded
in empirical reality. 6 9 Third, reasons given "must be truthful in the sense that
they are addressed to real problems rather than fabricated crises, the reasons
can't be ginned up after the fact, and the solutions should be fairly well suited
to the problem that has been identified."o7
Ensuring that government reasons are based in evidence is another way
of protecting vulnerable minorities because those who would do harm to
them will seek to cut comers by appealing to emotions, exaggerated concerns
of safety or public purpose-or in this case, wildly implausible arguments
that a move that objectively hurts minorities actually is benign and intended
to help them.7 Moreover, systematic tolerance of falsehoods doesn't just
license incompetence; it also makes bias more difficult to uncover. As I've
explained, "[e]xcluding falsity from the range of reasonable solutions helps
prevent domination of the less educated . .. and those with inadequate access
to reliable information. "72 Thus, enforcing the rule of reason can help
noncitizens and racial minorities, who aren't always able to defend their own
interests through ordinary political processes. 73
The two rationales are not identical, though. Beyond the expressive
differences in the rationales, the rule of reason traditionally gives an agency
more leeway than the principle of equality to come up with a different
justification for its decision when there is an earlier, tainted one. On the other
hand, we were not likely to see a holding that the government was forbidden
66 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018).
67 See generally TSAI, supra note 11, at 93-136.
68 See id. at 106.
69 See id.
70 Id at 107. It's true that there is a difference of opinion over how much deference
someone should get. In Roberts's view, an evidence-based reason by someone in authority
like the Secretary of Commerce is sufficient. See Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.
Ct. 2551, 2568-69 (2019). It matches his view of the presidency where control by the
president or high officials is paramount. By contrast, the dissenters believe that this decision
should not be reviewed by the courts, id at 2597-98 (Alito, J., dissenting), or that the record
sufficiently supported Secretary Ross's decision, id at 2576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 See New Yorkv. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d. 512, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
72 TSAI, supra note 11, at 107.
73 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (explaining the representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review, another way
constitutional law can protect those whose interests are not protected through ordinary
political process).
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from ever asking about citizenship on the census. A direct and broad
exposition on equality was never really in the cards here. Nor was the Court
ever going to impose a substantive limit, barring certain kinds of
demographic information from being collected through the Census. Under
those circumstances, Roberts's ruling is a good outcome because it tangibly
protects the rights of an embattled community and it's useful in a forward-
looking way to promote norms and practices upon which development of the
idea of equality depends.
The dissenters are probably wrong that the "pretext" holding will
somehow open the floodgates to judicial second-guessing of agency
decisions. People unhappy with agency decisions will surely sprinkle the
case in their briefs, but my guess is that, in most disputes, it will have no
impact. As Roberts points out, this is the "rare" case with such an "extensive"
record,'75 even though the Supreme Court had earlier blocked efforts to
depose Secretary Ross. Most challenges to agency decisions will remain as
easy cases based on a minimal record, where policy views are divided but no
serious constitutional difficulties lurk. In other words, this precedent will be
most potent when it can serve as a brokered stand-in for some other
constitutional violation when consensus is hard to reach for a stronger
justification.
If I'm right about this, the Census Case slots in comfortably among an
older line of cases in which a law or policy has been judicially stricken as
irrational, in circumstances where a serious claim of unequal treatment has
been made but practical considerations frustrated the resolution of the
dispute as a more robust equality violation.7 ' These cases have always
bothered the purists among us, who might be frustrated by their failure to
observe certain doctrinal niceties (e.g., a thorough application of the tiers of
scrutiny approach) or the absence of a more robust theory of equality. But
for those who believe that justice is an inescapably collaborative exercise
and that the grounds for compromise aren't always straightforward or
aesthetically pleasing, these precedents are nevertheless principled and have
value in both promoting consensus and ameliorating harms.
74 Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
75 Id. at 2575 (majority opinion).
76 See generally, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla.
Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 2007); Copelin-Brown v. N.M.
State Pers. Office, 399 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2005).
2020] 15
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LA WREVIEWARGUENDO
Of these cases, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno77
might be the closest analogue. There, the Justices invalidated an agency's
interpretation of the Food Stamp Act, which barred benefits to anyone who
lived in a household where residents were not "all related to each other."78
There was some concern about bias against hippies, but neither the agency's
guidelines nor the federal law made the mistake of overtly making that
distinction. 79 On top of that, hippies as a group probably would not have
satisfied the test usually employed to identify a "discrete and insular
minority" justifying elevated judicial scrutiny.so Nevertheless, at a decisive
moment in the decision, the Court found that the agency guideline "simply
does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud."8 ' In other
words, there was a mismatch between the reason given and the evidence
about how the policy actually operated-just like in the Census Case.82
It's important to note that the Justices there, too, felt that the rule of
reason would be helpful in reducing discrimination against the poor. As
Justice William 0. Douglas pointed out separately, laws of this sort tended
to fall heaviest on "desperately poor people with acute problems."8 3
Similarly, in the Census Case, Justice Breyer underscored the impression
among four Justices that something more serious lay behind the pretext: the
possibility of intentional discrimination, or at least unequal impact on some
members of society and certain jurisdictions.8  They preferred the stronger
medicine that adding the citizenship question was "arbitrary and capricious"
because it would "likely cause a disproportionate number of noncitizens and
Hispanics to go uncounted . .. [and] create a risk that some States would
wrongfully lose a congressional representative and funding."8
In an age when public officials have become more brazen in their
mendacity and democratic backsliding has grown as a serious problem, 6
Roberts's opinion is a welcome reminder that facts still matter and
77 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
78 Id at 530.
79 Id. at 534.
80 See generally United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
81 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537.
82 See my discussion of why the solution in Aoreno was less robust, and possibly
intrusive, than the rights-based solutions presented by other Justices. See TSAI, supra note 11,
at 109-11.
83 Aforeno, 413 U.S. at 541.
84 See Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2584 (2019) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
85 Id.
86 See Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J. FORUM 590, 592, 597
& n.27 (2019). See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIS DIE
(2019).
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government officials won't get blind deference. Rule of reason norms are
especially helpful for the project of equality because (1) technological
advances make it possible for enemies of equality to pursue nefarious goals
in sophisticated ways; (2) bureaucratic complexity and social networks make
it easier to plot while covering one's tracks; and (3) the government's
incredibly smart lawyers can dazzle judges with all manner of doctrinal
excuses and distractions. A due regard for empiricism enhances the work of
equality; conversely, formalism catches only the most stupid, brazen, and
inexcusable forms of injustice.
There's another case that comes to mind, where considerations of
equality lurked in the background, but the dispute was resolved according to
the rule of reason. Once again, as in the Census Case, "the evidence tells a
story that does not match the explanation." 7 The case is Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, where the Justices overturned a local ordinance that
prohibited group homes for the "feeble-minded."" There, government
officials tried to argue that the requirement existed to help minorities rather
than hurt them, but the Court found that incoherent.89 At that historical
moment, the Justices could've tried to develop the law in a more robust way
to protect disabled people more generally. The administration vigorously
opposed such a move, however, and there was insufficient support once
again for a more comprehensive doctrine to protect the disabled.
The good news is that the failure to agree on a more general approach
to ensuring the equal treatment of all disabled people didn't leave the deeply
problematic ordinance in place. Instead, the Justices found a way around the
roadblock. They were able to say that the law rested upon "mere negative
attitudes" against intellectually disabled people.90 Meanwhile, the debate
over how best to deal with disability-based discrimination was left to
percolate. Some commentators have read this merely as a case about animus,
but a key moment in the analysis found the city's explanations pretextual.
Justice White's opinion walked through the various reasons given by the city
to justify the ban-to keep intellectually disabled people safe from flood
waters, to ensure the tranquility of the neighborhood, to make sure the less
fortunate aren't teased by nearby schoolchildren-and found them all
inadequately supported by the evidence.91 This feature of the decision-
which is all about how a government justification can be irrational but not
87 Dep't of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
88 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 436 (1985).
89 See id. at 448-50.
90 Id. at 448.
91 See id. at 448-50.
2020] 17
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LA WREVIEWARGUENDO
necessarily express hatred-can stand alone from the Court's further
inference that the real reason was fear of disabled people.
It's worth noting that then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist signed off
on this practical solution in Cleburne,92 just as Chief Justice Roberts found
the rule of reason attractive in the census dispute. Both men enjoy a
reputation as institutional conservatives who not only cared about the
historical reputation of the Supreme Court, but also could be moved by
procedural values even if they were skeptical of far-reaching theories of
rights. 93
In terms of the census fight, the ruling gave the plaintiffs the opportunity
to move forward with discovery to try to connect the dots between the new
evidence of bias and key administration figures. At the same time, it left
room for policymakers to try to probe their options and pacify a disgruntled
president. They could try to moot the earlier action by beginning a new
process and developing a differentjustification for asking about respondents'
citizenship. A few of the president's allies briefly floated a plan for him to
sign an executive order or memorandum claiming some sort of emergency
to justify adding the question at the last moment9 4-though they would be
hoping that judges would agree that the executive branch has a more active
role in conducting the census than what the Constitution seemingly says. Of
course, whether a new reason would really be "new" and sufficiently
untainted by the previous "pretextual" reason would be an important
question.
At all events, time was not on the administration's side. Even if
President Trump bypassed the administrative process by signing an
executive order, litigation would still follow. 95 On this score, the additional
costs imposed on the government by enforcing the rule of reason, plus the
judicial admonishing about lying to judges, were already worth its weight in
gold to those concerned about the anti-equality effects of the
administration's plan. Armed with additional, more thorough evidence, the
92 See TSAI, supra note 11, at 96-98. See generally William D. Araiza, Was Cleburne
an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 621, 641-48 (2017).
93 See TSAI, supra note 11, at 97 (explaining how Rehnquist opened the door to
consensus based on the rule of reason with more liberal jurists in Cleburne by saying 'it
would not bother me greatly' to resolve the controversy in this fashion"); Greenhouse, supra
note 45.
94 See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Gilson B. Gray III, How to Put Citizenship Back in the
Census, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-put-
citizenship-back-in-the-census- 11562264430 [https://perma.cc/R6CP-9MRV]; Michael
Wines & Adam Liptak, Trump Considering an Executive Order to Allow Citizenship Question
on Census, N.Y. TIEs (July 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/us/census-
question.html [https://perma.cc/A468-N3ZK].
95 See Rivkin & Gray, supra note 94.
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record could look very different from the one originally before the Supreme
Court-especially if the trial judge finds a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause on remand after a full trial.
On July 11, 2019, the administration decided to throw in the towel. 96
There would be no citizenship question on the 2022 census. 97 Reality had
finally settled in that the president would either have to resort to extralegal
means to get his way, or else risk disrupting the census and increase the
possibility of an inaccurate count. Promising not to add the question to the
2022 census ensured that no more embarrassing details about Republican
gerrymandering efforts would come from this lawsuit. Key figures involved
in the decisions would no longer be under threat of being deposed under oath.
At a hastily assembled press conference at 5 p.m., President Trump tried
to put a happy face on his decision by announcing that he was signing an
executive order ordering all agencies to give citizenship information to the
Census Bureau,98 but that's something he could already have done. In the
same press conference, Attorney General William Barr said "it was a
logistical impediment, not a legal one." 99 But that's not quite right. The legal
standard-the rule of reason-in this instance created a formidable logistical
impediment that proved exceedingly difficult to overcome.
CONCLUSION
When full-throated equality was not procedurally or strategically
possible, the rule of reason had become the language of consensus and
justice. The Court had all but closed the gap for executive response by
releasing the decision on the last day of the term, June 27, just four days
before the date the Solicitor General had indicated as the date on which forms
needed to begin printing. Barr acknowledged the potency of Roberts's
gambit:
There is simply no way to litigate these issues and obtain relief from
the current injunctions in time to implement any new decision
without jeopardizing our ability to carry out the census, which
we're not going to do.... So as a practical matter, the Supreme
Court's decision closed all paths to adding the question to the 2020
census.ioo
96 See Remarks by President Trump on Citizenship and the Census, THE WHITE HOUSE
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The President did suggest that the administration might later take the
position that the allocation of political power could still take place based on
citizens or the "voter-eligible population" rather than the entire population
in a state,' 0' but that's a constitutional fight for another day.1 0 2 The precise
set of equality concerns and risks identified by this lawsuit-undercounting
through deterrence-had been dealt with effectively.
A different administration could try again in 2030, but litigation would
surely follow. Whatever happens next, it cannot be gainsaid that the rule of
reason operated as an effective substitute for equality when a ruling on that
ground was simply not possible. And the awful chain of events feared by at
least four Justices, experts at the census bureau, and many friends of equality
has not transpired. That's a win for equality, even if it took a work-around to
get there.
101 See id.
102 Indeed, the President's executive order invites states to do something that no state
has yet tried to do: "design State and local legislative districts based on the population of
voter-eligible citizens" rather than all people. Exec. Order No. 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,823
(July 16, 2019). The constitutionality of such a plan has not been addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See id. 33,823-24. However, according to Trump, the Department of
Commerce indicated that "if the officers or public bodies having initial responsibility for the
legislative districting in each State indicate a need for tabulations of citizenship data, the
Census Bureau will make a design change to make such information available." Id. at 33,824.
20 [88: 1
